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JAPAN REPORT

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'CRISIS-MANAGEMENT SET-UP' CRITIQUED

Tokyo GEKKAN SHAKAITO in Japanese Aug 84 pp 124-135

[Article by Koichiro Yoshiwara: "Establishment of a "Crisis-Management Set-Up" by the Ad Hoc Commissions on Administrative Reform, Security Affairs, and Educational Affairs"]

[Text] The Eerie Appearance of the Management Society

FANUC is a subsidiary of Fujitsu, Ltd; its plant is in Oshino at the foot of Mount Fuji. On its vast grounds, with yellow buildings lining both sides of the road, there were just a few cars and not a soul to be seen. There were no guards, and when we entered the building lobby there was no receptionist either. So we had to look for the person in the General Affairs Division who was in charge of public relations to let them know that we had arrived at the appointed time.

Actually, however, we need not have been concerned about such things, because when the factory was explained to us by the female head of the Public Relations Section who presently appeared, we found out that they had already known about our arrival. In other words, we had been under observation and under psychological control.

At this factory robots are being made by other robots. There must have been about 120 employees. The factory is operated by a handful of persons who do the programming. All processes are carried out by robots: the manufacture of components, their receipt into the warehouse, transportation, and assembly, and the receipt [of finished products] at the warehouse. The only things required are the brains to program it.

The only time when it can be seen in its ideal form is at lunch time and at night when the robots are alone moving in pitch darkness. It is said that at these times there is only one person in the control center. A pitch dark factory without a soul, with only robots moving--could anything be more eerie and disquieting? And is this not the extreme model of a controlled society?

The Tachikawa Base and Public Security Training

There is a feeling that a new political season has begun to advance like an avalanche toward what is called "that day". But, although "that day" is certain to come, it was never spoken of outwardly, and some other expression was always used in place of "that day." It was referred to by some all-embracing expression such as "a great earthquake," or "a war," or "an emergency." There is uncertainty regarding the arrival of "a great earthquake" or "a war." In ordinary times one prepares systems covering all aspects: political, economic, educational, cultural, which can deal with these uncertain "emergencies," and begins to build them in advance; this is referred to as "the establishment of a crisis management set-up." In fact, it is really a new form of fascism.

But what is the actual function in establishing this set-up? Strangely enough, no one mentions that "that day" refers to the day when the Showa era changes to the next era [i.e. when there is a change of emperors].

It was in March 1972 that the helicopters of the Self-Defense Forces' Eastern District Air Defense Force suddenly flew into the U.S. force's Tachikawa base. At that time the Tachikawa base had not yet been formally returned to the Japanese. Eighty-two percent of the residents of Tachikawa opposed the Self-Defense Forces' coming into the base after the departure of the U.S. forces. Nevertheless, the move [of the Self-Defense Forces] from the sky was enforced.

Up to that time the procedure followed by the Self-Defense Forces was to move on to the U.S. military base or exercise grounds scheduled to be returned and settle in permanently after a period of joint use but, in the move to the Tachikawa base, the very objective for which the base was to be used was different. The Eastern District Air Defense Force, from the very beginning, has been a public security unit, and Tachikawa is a strategic location for the control of the capital region.

In a work which discussed "the preparation of a domestic legal system to accompany rearmament," (Masuhiro) Sasabe, a member of the National Defense College, stipulated, as follows, the case in which national emergency powers would be invoked:

"Under the present unrevised constitution, we could not deal with a national emergency under the existing law. It cannot be denied that in such a case the law could be violated and extralegal powers invoked. It would be precisely the sort of situation in which 'the law would remain silent' in the exercise of military force.'" This is the force exercised by the government, approving the existing order in a situation where the forces for and the forces against the existing order had reached a state of extreme chaos," ("The Self-Defense Forces and Basic Legal Theory" ["Jieitai To Kihonteki Ho Riron"] 1958).

Furthermore, he held that emergency countermeasures should be prepared based on national contingency powers for "situations which are not this type of

super emergency but which are managed within the framework of the constitution." The forcible move of the Eastern District Air Defense Force to Tachikawa was none other than a concrete development in the preparation of legal arrangements which had continued since the "Mitsuya Study" of 1963.

For instance, the basic tactic of public security units for isolating "riots" is to surround the entire riot area and isolate it from contact with the outside. In order to do that, strategic points on the periphery of a city are controlled, checkpoints are established, transportation in and out is regulated, entry to the area of unrest is prohibited to the general populace and hostile elements are uncovered. At the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake [of 1923, which was used as an opportunity for a purge of dissident elements], under martial law, 53,000 army troops were dispatched, checkpoints were set up in 168 places and a squad of troops and a number of police officers were posted at each.

Thus one prevents reinforcement of opposing forces by isolating the area in which the public security tactics are to be developed, and the main units of the Self-Defense Forces move toward the objectives to be subdued. In nineteen seventy, the 10th year after 1960 and [the year which ended the initial] period of the security treaty as stipulated therein, there was an upsurge [of unrest] in connection with the struggle over the return of Okinawa; on 3 October 1969, the Self-Defense Forces opened public security exercises to the press corps for the first time at the East Fuji exercise grounds. The press demonstrated for a 210-member technical corp how a city is subdued, but on the following day an exercise on a larger scale was carried out in secret.

At 5 p.m. on the day of the public security exercise it was assumed that a tense situation had developed and troops were ordered placed on standby alert to put down riots. At 1:30 a.m. on 4 [October] all members of the unit were summoned to an emergency, and an hour later the order was given to take the field. The participating units were a subduing force of between 1,000 and 2,000 [literally 1,000 and several hundred] men and a resisting force of 1,000 men. Thus, during the night they had carried out the prearranged maneuvers and deployment, occupied important strongpoints, set up positions at important transportation points, and strengthened the areas under guard. When the people of the city awoke they found the entire city under military control.

This is the basic form, not only of public-security tactics, but also of a coup d'etat; at such a time the Tachikawa base would play a vital role. As I had written earlier, for control of the eastern Kanto region [Tochigi, Ibaraki and Chiba prefectures] there is the 1st Airborne Corps (1,300 men) at Narashino in Chiba prefecture, a unit under the direct command of the director-general of the Defense Agency and, in the support area at Kisarazu [also in Chiba prefecture], there is the 1st Helicopter Corps (600 men). Meanwhile, the Tachikawa base has 3,000 men of the Fuji Training Corps which,

as might be expected, is under the direct command of the director-general, and Tachikawa is at the relay point. This means that to the military Narashino and Tachikawa are indispensable and strategic for bringing Tokyo under control overnight (even if it is a coup d'etat).

The Role of the Tachikawa Base in Controlling the Capital

The Self-Defense Forces, which created a fait accompli in this manner by suddenly dropping out of the blue, later used the base jointly with U.S. forces, and stationed themselves there, ostensibly for temporary use, even after U.S. forces had returned the base [to Japanese control]. And it was [not until 23 October, 1978 that the Ministry of Finance and the National Land Agency submitted to the (Subcommittee on Disposition of National Property) kokuyu zaisan shori shoiinkai] an outline proposal of a plan to utilize the former site of the 466-hectare Tachikawa base which had been returned by January 1977. The plan called for dividing the site into a large national park, a wide-area disaster-prevention base, a commercial district, reserve areas and an arterial road. By calling it a wide-area disaster-prevention base, the Self-Defense Forces revealed their intention to use the site on a permanent basis; this was in direct opposition to a local community proposal for its "peaceful development through a comprehensive utilization by the local community" which had been prepared by Tokyo and the two cities of Tachikawa and Akishima in September 1977 before the return of the base.

However, base subsidies of 510 million yen were announced for Tachikawa city, 210 million yen more than expected, and 123 million yen for Akishima city, 118 million yen more than expected; [their impact] can be seen from the newspaper headlines which reported: "The Tachikawa and Akishima Base Subsidies: Shock at the Huge Amounts Offered." First, the mayor of Tachikawa weakened under the money tactics of the base subsidies. Next, the city council, too, brought in the police [presumably to remove persons who were blocking the podium or the like], forced a vote and approved the central government's plan, rejecting even the deliberations for a proposed referendum. In the case of Akishima, even the mayor's opposition was in vain; after a number of failed attempts the city council approved the central government's plan and, with the approval of the Self-Defense Forces presence [literally sit-in] by Governor Suzuki [of the Tokyo Metropolitan District] who had become governor on 14 September, 1979, construction was begun under the site utilization plan, the nucleus of which was a Self-Defense Force base called a wide-area disaster-prevention base which had a 1,320-meter runway on which C-1 jet transport aircraft could land and take off.

The remarks of Colonel (Noju) Hishida who arrived as base commander give a good picture of what the function of this wide-area disaster-prevention base would be.

"We must possess the will to respond instantly at any time to defend the nation's sovereignty in time of emergency. If we constantly maintain this state of mental preparedness, we will also be able to respond fully at times of earthquake disaster. In the future we must practice for earthquake disasters not

only with diagrams but also with practical exercises," (MAINICHI 13 February, 1980).

Then, on 1 March, 1982, when even the original plan for the other facilities of the wide-area disaster-prevention base had not yet been completed and much less work had been started on park construction, the Self-Defense Forces' new Tachikawa airfield was completed and put into use. The National Land Agency showed its original plan to Tachikawa City on 27 September, 1982; the contents were as follows:

"Within the L-shaped piece of land containing the arterial road (60 meters wide) which cuts vertically through the site of the former base in a north-south direction, the 19.52 hectares which parallel the runway will contain the following facilities beginning in the north: 1) firefighting, 2) sea rescue, 3) disaster-response headquarters [saigai taisaku jisshi hombu] and 4) police and firefighting disaster prevention. It has been arranged that in the event of a large-scale disaster occurring in the southern Kanto region, all of these would function, together with the adjacent Self-Defense Force airbase, as a base for 'frontline units.'

The 11.44 hectares situated at right angles to the arterial road are allotted to: 1) medical treatment facilities, 2) food storehouses, 3) quarters for disaster-prevention staff and 4) facilities related to regional disaster prevention; and there are plans to have it function as a 'support base.'" (ASAHI 28 September, 1982).

To be sure, these wide-area disaster-prevention bases are based on the "Outline of the Disposition of the National Land [Constituted by] the Returned Tachikawa Airbase," a report submitted to the Central National Property Council in November 1979, and it had been decided that "it would be the base for emergency disaster-countermeasure activities in the event that a disaster occurred over a wide area in the southern Kanto region," but the ASAHI of the same date expressed the following doubts regarding the content of the plan that the National Land Agency had explained to the city authorities:

"According to the supplementary explanation by the National Land Agency, when informally notifying the city officials concerned, the 'disaster-response implementation headquarters' will be the center of the 'frontline units' and will coordinate the various relief activities. Furthermore, it is reported that facilities related to police and firefighting disaster prevention will all have heliport facilities and will also carry on normal activities for the Tama region during normal times.




Figure 1. Diagram of Plans for Utilization of the Former Site of the Tachikawa Base

Key:

1. [Arterial] road
2. Reserve area
3. Ome [railroad] line
4. Reserve area
5. Higashi Nakagami (Akishima City)
6. Zone division of Showa Memorial Park
 - A: Cultural facilities zone (culture center etc.)
 - B: Exhibition facilities zone (exhibition plaza etc.)
 - C: Forest zone (potted plants, Japanese garden etc.)
 - D: Plaza zone (fields, cycling course etc.)
 - E: Water zone (waterfowl pond etc.)
7. Showa Memorial Park
8. Nishitachikawa (Tachikawa City)
9. Wide-area disaster prevention base [character omitted]
10. Reserve area
11. Area currently approved for temporary utilization by the Self-Defense Forces
12. Reserve area
13. Tachikawa
14. Chuo [railroad] line

But since a fire station and a police station are already included in the 'commercial area' planned for this same former base, the question of the nature of 'normal activities' appears likely to occasion debate in the future. It has been explained that among the 'support bases,' the medical treatment facility is the Tachikawa Hospital which possesses 'special functions for diagnosis and treatment,' and the food storehouse is the base for stockpiling rice and dried bread; but here, too, the exact nature of the 'special diagnosis and treatment' is unclear, so it leaves [unanswered] the questions on the type and scale of disaster which the central government has in mind."

It is said that the reason for building a police station both in the commercial quarter and in the wide-area disaster-prevention base is to provide a headquarters in both areas with [the second area] also being given the functions of a disaster-response headquarters as an auxiliary government office structure with a heliport. And it is said that the firestation would also have the same function and that "special diagnosis and treatment" means "medical treatment" of disaster victims.. If this is true there is no need to use a term like "special diagnosis and treatment"; it seems to me that they are considering something like the old army's military hospitals which correspond to the headquarters of field hospitals set up temporarily in each district.

Producing a State of Marial Law

In any case, the wide-area disaster-prevention base would function as the nucleus of public-security countermeasures during an "emergency," and the security plan for the 26 October, 1983 ceremony marking the partial opening of Showa Memorial Park suggested what, in the event of an "emergency," would become of this park, which was named to commemorate the 50th year of the emperor's reign. In preparation for the ceremony, which was to be attended by the emperor, the Metropolitan Police Department followed the unprecedented procedure of borrowing [all] the parks in the entire Tachikawa city area.

The Metropolitan Police Department applied for permission to use 130 parks in Tachikawa beginning with city parks, even including children's parks and playgrounds; it applied to borrow all the parks for 26 [October], the day of the ceremony, to use some of the parks on the 25th, and to use one area Showa Memorial Park straight through from 22 to 31 [October]. The "object of utilization" which the Metropolitan Police Department wrote in the space provided on the application form was as "a standby location for security units accompanying the opening of the park."

Due to opposition by the people of Tachikawa to the Metropolitan Police Department's application to borrow all the parks, the Department actually ended up borrowing 41 places, corresponding to one-third of the parks and children's playgrounds in the city. On the day of the ceremony the Metropolitan Police Department called out 8,000 men for security duty, concentrating one-half of them in the area between the Kunitachi-Fuchu interchange on the Chuo Parkway [chuo jidoshado] and the ceremony site through

which the emperor's motorcade would pass. Security was made particularly tight around the ceremony site and along the road, producing a state of martial law in Tachikawa city.

Why would the Metropolitan Police Department have occupied even children's playgrounds for a park-opening ceremony? This former U.S. base was 466 hectares but, the park to be opened was only 70 hectares, so almost 400 hectares were vacant land. It was not at all too small as a standby location for the 8,000-men security force. Why, then, did the Metropolitan Police Department try to occupy even children's playgrounds, and throughout the entire area at that?

As is well known, children's parks and playgrounds are scattered in every part of a city. For placing under police surveillance the residents of each district, children's parks and playgrounds would be expected to be the most suitable standby locations.

But even though the emperor was to attend, it is questionable whether it was necessary to have such a disposition of guards for a park-opening ceremony. To be sure, a new leftist group which had continued the struggle against the base had organized an opposition movement asserting "Stop the park-opening which Glorifies the Emperor," and on the day of the ceremony it held demonstrations at three locations in Tachikawa as well as processions in the city. But only about 300 people took part, and the Tachikawa City Employees Union did no more than strike for an hour beginning at 8:30 [a.m.]. In other words, the situation had not necessitated depriving the children of their playgrounds and, as stated by the people of the city, it is the people of the city who were inconvenienced by this "overpolicing".

"Anticipating [a lot of business from] the opening of the park, the 30 shopping districts and large stores in Tachikawa totaling approximately 1,800 shops prepared decorations, pennants, aprons and so on under a unified theme, and unfolded a celebration campaign beginning on 23 October, 3 days before the opening of the park. But on the important day itself both of the department stores at the north entrance to Tachikawa Station had their regular weekly day off, and throughout town the number of people in the shopping districts was the same as on ordinary days. The local shopping districts which had built up a mood of celebration were disappointed, saying: 'they make a big fuss about security [and don't care about our business],'" (ASAHI 21 October, 1983).

Judging from the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the public security police, one would expect that they knew in advance such things as the scale of the new-left gatherings on the day of the ceremony and the extent of the problem with the city employees union, so I feel that the inconvenience which overpolicing would bring to the people of the city and the harm it would bring to the shopping districts had been taken into consideration by the police. This overpolicing, to the point of taking over not only city parks but also children's playgrounds and other playgrounds, was not for the ceremony of that

day; it was for nothing less than putting into practice the public security and guard actions for which police are responsible in an "emergency," by seizing the opportunity of the park-opening ceremony with the emperor in attendance.

Moreover, this security posture of the police made clear that fact that while it is natural that the reserve areas, on which construction of public facilities is scheduled and for which commercial districts and the attraction of universities are already included in the plans, would not be freely available for police use in the event of an "emergency," the police do not expect to utilize the 170-hectare national park either. Nor does it appear likely that it is being secured as a place of refuge for disaster victims.

Who, then, will use it? As I indicated at the beginning, Tachikawa is ranked as an advanced strategic base for protecting Tokyo. When the Self-Defense Forces' Eastern Area Airborne Unit moved into Tachikawa by helicopter and Colonel Hishida arrived as commander, he said: "We have returned." It is unlikely that this only meant they were returning to Tachikawa as the birthplace of the army's airborne unit. After all, the old military had been created to suppress "the people" by force, and the only reason which can be considered for the existence of the Self-Defense Force base at Tachikawa is "public security operations during an emergency."

In other words, Tachikawa's Showa Memorial Park will be secured as a bivouac area for all of the units stationed in the Tachikawa support area, including the Fuji School, the Fuji Training Corps, the Technical Training Corps and the Tank Training Corps. It is well known that nationally administered parks close at 5 p.m., and when one considers that security operations and coups d'etat are most effective when carried out at night, the 5 p.m. closing time for Showa Memorial Park comes to take on a different meaning.

When Will The State of Emergency Occur?

I first came to write about the utilization of the forest site of the Tachikawa base because I wanted to touch upon the substantive function of Showa Memorial Park, the nucleus of which is the wide-area disaster prevention base, during an "emergency."

I have already written that while it is not impossible that a war or a major disaster will occur, they are uncertain "emergencies"; the emergency which is sure to come, and which is regarded as the greatest "crisis" by the authorities is "Showa X Day" [i.e. the day of the present emperor's death].

HOSO REPOTO [BROADCASTING REPORT] edited by the Japan Federation of Commercial Broadcast Workers' Unions (July 1979 issue) had a special issue entitled "Prepare Top Secret Directives for 'The Last Day of the Showa Era.'" It was written by a certain private-sector television station in the mid-1960's concerning the "Summary of Broadcasting Countermeasures During a State of Emergency". It held that "a state of emergency" referred to the following four cases:

- 1) A disaster befalling the emperor, empress or equivalent member of the imperial household.
- 2) The outbreak of a war of serious consequences for Japan.
- 3) The occurrence within Japan of a rebellion or equivalent situation.
- 4) The occurrence of a natural disaster which greatly affects large numbers of the Japanese people, disease epidemics, and the like or other situations which greatly affect the nation and its people.

It is possible for these "states of emergency" to occur singly, but there are also cases in which 3) could occur because of situation 1), and it is also conceivable that 3) could occur due to 2) or 4). Under the "Mitsuya Study" research is being carried out on [a situation] equivalent to a coup d'etat, in the context of a crisis corresponding to 2) in which war erupted at the 38th parallel [in Korea]; the Self-Defense Forces would carry out public security operations, opposition-party Diet members would be placed in a state of confinement, and wartime legislation would be placed on the agenda and approved as a package. This corresponds to the "situation equivalent to" a rebellion in 3). Setting aside the question of whether or not it corresponds to 4), the possibility of a state of martial law created by the Self-Defense Forces is not inconceivable, even without considering that the same thing had once produced the massacre of Koreans, the massacre of left-wing activists, the (Kamedo Incident) [kamedo jiken] and so on through the deliberate spreading of false rumors at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake [1923]. People are constantly talking about a great earthquake in the Tokai region [the area between Kyoto and Tokyo], which is highly probable but, as mentioned previously, the thing which is sure to come some day is 1), that is, "Showa X Day."

Concerning "Showa X Day" Hitoshi Suzuki believed: "The thing which must be considered in advance is that while X Day is the day of the passing away of the emperor, it is also the day of the birth of a new emperor," ("The Mass Media Have Finished Preparations for Showa X Day," HOSEKI [JEWEL] May 1984) and wrote as follows.

"[The Showa era began] barely 15 years after the death of the Emperor Meiji. During this 15-year reign of the ill and feeble Emperor Taisho, the internal conditions of the Great Japanese Empire were extremely precarious, so great hopes were placed on the Emperor Showa. The mass media of the time, the great newspapers, took this opportunity to concentrate on their first and second pages the tears and joy of all the people of the nation and, through this means, tried to win over the hearts of the people.

A state of emergency sometimes triggers a greater, or a different type of emergency, but it can also be the opportunity to bring under control at one stroke a different emergency which had begun to arise. After the tears were shed at the death of the emperor, Taisho, the change to the new emperor shunted the turbulent domestic politics, begun in the mid-Taisho era, toward the side of restraint. But this all happened under the old constitution. However much the 'tears' continued, and however

much the campaign was carried on with 'joy' as the common feeling of all the people of the nation, the vast majority of the people were in a condition which permitted this.

Things are different now. From a world viewpoint there is probably a more symbolic meaning to 'the passing of the Hirohito [Japanese normally do not refer to the emperor by this name in print] era.' This is the basic difference between the X Day of the Taisho era and that of the Showa era."

Hitoshi Suzuki says that foremost among the basic differences between the X days of the Taisho and Showa eras is the great revolution in mass media. The second is that it is not a time of [loyal] senior statesmen but of groups based on organizational management, and the third is that the crown prince "for some reason or other, does not give the impression of being a strong leader."

Suzuki says further that "to turn a symbol into a real image one's 'image strategy' must have been completed. Until one is confident of that, it may be an ironic situation in which, conversely, one cannot achieve the effect of the birth of a new emperor unless one delays the 'emperor's X Day.'"

It cannot be denied that Japanese capitalism which achieved growth under the bureaucracy of the emperor system from the Meiji era on through the Taisho and Showa eras suffered a setback with the 1945 defeat in war, and that through the metamorphosis [of the emperor] from a "living god" to a "symbol", called a "human emperor" due to the emperor's responsibility for the war, Japanese capitalism was revived and prosperity made possible. Consequently it is not difficult to imagine that they [i.e. Japanese capitalists] feel a real sense of crisis in regard to "Showa X Day."

The Crisis For The Capitalist System

However, it is only after the historic defeat of U.S. imperialistic forces in Indochina and the oil shock of 1973 that there suddenly began the calls for something like "the establishment of a crisis management set-up" or "the establishment of a comprehensive security arrangement." In the post-Vietnam era the "crisis" of the capitalist system was related to the reality of whether or not the counterrevolution against the upsurge and expansion of revolution would succeed, and the oil shock which followed brought the frailty of the capitalist system to light.

It is widely known that although Japan had seized the chance for reconstruction through the Korean War which erupted in 1950 and accumulated great affluence through the policy of high economic growth from 1960 onward, it suffered a setback due to the oil shock and was plunged into a period of chronic recession from the latter half of the 1970's into the 1980's. While this was going on, in contrast to the fact that up to the 1960's the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement had stressed military reciprocity, upon entering the 1970's a tilt toward an economic emphasis, which should perhaps be termed

economic security, was strengthened, and the "system of prior consultation" which had been used as a means of emphasizing the reciprocity of security became a dead letter; at the same time, the "sphere of the Far East" [the area mentioned in the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty] went on expanding to cover the entire Pacific Ocean as seen in the sealane defense which forms the military background for the concept of the Pacific Basin Economic Sphere.

Meanwhile, at the same time that the policy of high economic growth from the 1960's into the 1970's brought ruin to the land, as vividly shown in the "Report of the Central Council for Education" which advocated a third educational reform, the system of overemphasis on scholastic records in the selection process, which derives from dependence on an advanced industrial society, resulted in the ruination of education; delinquency and household violence became social problems, and the middle-class philosophy based on giving priority to consumption, which was created by the myth of the GNP, gave birth to the "crisis" of the breakdown of the family as seen in the "hell of loansharking." [i.e. the agony of persons who commit suicide etc. because they are unable to pay the high interest on unsecured loans to salary men].

One of the indexes of the ruling class's perception of this sort of "crisis," which has been revealed both at home and abroad is "The Development of a Comprehensive Strategy Based Upon Changes in the International Environment and Our Nation's Economy and Society" which was put together by the Nomura Reserach Institute in June 1977.

"Against the background of the amazing development which our nation achieved in spite of its catastrophic defeat in World War II, there is a complacency in our national character which looks upon the defeat in war as something finished, a simple-mindedness which cannot accurately evaluate the influence of America which has supported our postwar prosperity; conversely, due to our being an island nation, our national character is imbued with an insensitivity to international points of view, and there is a naivete in our recognition of the national crisis we may have to confront. This dullness in our sense of crisis, and the lack of a crisis management set-up which derives from it is not likely to be solved quickly, though recently the situation has changed somewhat in regard to energy. It is probably necessary to increase considerably the Japanese people's recognition of the potential crisis and to take it up as a problem to be solved by the nation. In the next 10 or 20 years the unrest and instability of a transitional period of international structural reform are forecast, and a crisis could occur in a form which 'had not been thought of' or thought of as 'not needing to be considered.'"

The danger in this sense of "crisis" lies in the idea "to increase the Japanese people's recognition of the potential crisis," which stipulates the crisis in terms of a consciousness which transcends class and brings the people together in a national consensus.

This report of the Nomura Reserach Institute describes crisis management as

"a comprehensive system of all activities, diplomatic, economic, cultural, political and military, for controlling the various kinds of crises or states of tension confronted by the nation at a level which makes management possible." It gives the following as necessary measures:

"Crisis management should include a policy of crisis countermeasures during normal times before a crisis, and a system which will predict crises in advance and give warning. The crisis countermeasures are:

1) Research on the avoidance of crises: study of diplomatic bargaining. Study of the possibility of international mediation (particularly the use of American influence), promotion of agreements on international stockpiling and accommodation, study of a policy for obtaining raw materials and energy sources domestically, and so on.

2) Research on emergency countermeasures: plans for compulsory economizing of energy, for optimal distribution of stockpiles, for price stabilization, for transportation of required volume, policies for restriction of demand (a coupon system and so on), legislation and a public relations system for a time of emergency.

3) Research on terminating crises: a policy on concessions to buyer nations, study of alternate sources of supply, requests for use of American influence, conversion of the domestic economic system, unemployment countermeasures, similar countermeasures to quiet domestic upheaval, and so on.

If [Japan] is to accomplish this type of crisis management, it is necessary to have not only a great deal of research on countermeasure policies but a system capable of grasping the situation and discerning the future, the authority and responsibility to make firm decisions, and the authority to completely carry through decisions in a short period of time. To achieve this, a basic task is to create conditions for carrying on open and sober debate on scenarios of national crises; the dispatch of foreign [enemy] troops to Japanese territory, the crossing of Japan's borders by refugees during disputes between nations with tense relations, retaliation for a violation of another nation's territory by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, and so on.

As for early warning systems, [Japan] should probably have first of all a preventive apparatus capable of sensing conflicts which might occur between Japan and the United States, and thus prevent them in order to maintain the friendly relationship between the two nations. This is because the probability of the occurrence of a national crisis is dictated to a considerable extent by the degree to which Japan can depend upon America. Based upon this premise, the following matters should be provide for:

1) An information-gathering capability: the building of personal contacts in other countries, the building of a system to provide information from trading companies and multinational enterprises. Invitation of various international organs to Japan, the construction and operation of data banks, and so on.

2) An information-transmission capability: the establishment of a system for the smooth transmission of information both domestically and overseas.

3) A set-up for system management: management under authority and leadership. At the same time, there would be guarantees of the freedom to acquire and study information within allowable limits." In other words, the report asserts that it is necessary to create a concept of "crisis management" as an improvement and strengthening of a managed system of rule which includes prior prevention, and the gathering, analysis, transmission and spreading of information under powerful controls, and to attempt to bring it to practical realization.

The Crisis Management Set-Up Being Prepared

It is often said that the crisis management set-up is being promoted on the three pillars of the ad hoc commissions on administrative reform, security affairs, and educational affairs. It has already been reported that in a lateral career move Director General [Masaharu] Gotoda of the Administrative Management Agency, who had been the cabinet minister in charge of promoting administrative reform, was appointed the first director general of the General Affairs Agency [somucho], and that his policy is to attempt the establishment of a crisis management set-up. Judging from the arrangement of personnel appointments he is building a set-up led by bureaucrats from the former Ministry of Home Affairs. It can also be said that the "Political Parties Law," which corresponds to the prewar "Public Peace Protection Law" [chian iji ho], represents the legal preparations making possible the "prior prevention" which the Nomura Research Institute's report regards as a necessary apparatus.

The Nomura Research Institute report cites the following as the foremost tasks in preparing a "crisis management set-up": the prediction of major earthquakes and natural disasters, the preparation of a warning system, the estimation of domestic impact and [preparation of] emergency control, disaster prevention, and public security countermeasures to deal with it. The function of the Showa Memorial Park, centered on the wide-area disaster prevention base, and the security plan for the day of the park-opening ceremony relate to this through the previously mentioned utilization of the former site of the Tachikawa base.

From the very beginning, the move toward educational reform following the attacks against textbooks which began around 1980 was designed to arouse the people's national consciousness, and the transmission and dissemination of controlled, managed information has already been proven in the incident of the Soviet airspace violation and shooting down of an aircraft which occurred before dawn on 1 September 1983.

It is not possible at this time to touch upon the question of what sort of scenarios are being created for "that day," but "that day," in other words, "X Day", will surely come, so I will at least point out that detailed scenarios are being written with an eye on that day.

ECONOMIC

POLICY, BUDGETS FOR OVERSEAS ECONOMIC COOPERATION REVIEWED

Tokyo LDP COMMITTEE in Japanese 29 Aug 84 [unpaginated]

[Text] Outline of LDP Ad Hoc Committee Proceedings on Overseas Economic Cooperation

1. Date and time: 29 August 1984 (Wednesday), 13:00-14:20.
2. Place: LDP Party Headquarters, room 701.
3. Subject: Estimated budget requests for fiscal 1985 foreign economic cooperation.
4. LDP members present: Heihachiro Yamazaki, Tatsuo Tanaka, Yoshiyuku Toke, Jun Shiozaki, Motoharu Morishita, Hiroshi Miyazawa, Raishiro Koga, Michihiko Kano, Isamu Imai, Shigemi Sunada, Tsutomu Haneda, Hiroaki Moriya, Jun Ejima.
5. Representatives present from: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MoFA], Ministry of Finance [MoF], Economic Planning Agency [EPA], Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI], Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education [MoE], Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Construction [MoC], Science and Technology Agency, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
6. Outline of proceedings: After opening remarks by Ad Hoc Committee Head Yamazaki, explanations were presented concerning materials submitted by the MoFA, MoF, EPA, and MITI.

Questions and Answers

Representative Imai: What is to be done if the goal of doubling the ODA [Overseas Development Aid] budget cannot be achieved?

MoFA Economic Cooperation Bureau Head: We are in the difficult position of having to achieve 31.3 percent growth in 1984 and 1985 in order to reach the goal, but as there are some unsettled problems, such as the exchange rate, we would like to make efforts for another year.

In addition, there is the goal of doubling the ODA general account budget. In order to reach this goal, an increase of 21 percent will be necessary in fiscal 1985. We plan to press on without giving up our call for a 21 percent budget increase until the budget is drawn up at the end of this year.

Representative Imai: Unless great efforts are made the goal will not be reached. We too want to make efforts to achieve this primary goal this year.

Representative Moriya: I would like a list of the aid activities being carried out by nongovernment organizations (NGO). In the Netherlands I hear that there is an organization of NGO which carries out activities from a fund they have set up.

Economic Cooperation Bureau Head: Ten percent of ODA activities are carried out through NGO not only in the Netherlands, but also in France, the United States, West Germany, and others (the figure for Japan is 1 percent). Unlike in Japan, there is a long history of aid activities being carried out by private organizations in these countries. For example, West Germany is providing military-governed Chile with aid through NGO. There is the advantage of being able to support friendly ties through aid, even when such aid is difficult to provide openly.

Representative Sunada: The government as a whole is not devoting itself to fulfillment of international commitments to double the ODA budget within 5 years. In order to support the plan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should make efforts to establish cabinet-level meetings on this issue. Concerning economic cooperation, multiple government offices, such as Export-Import Bank of Japan, foundations, and JICA [Japan International Cooperation Agency], which are interrelated for no purpose are competing for the same job. There is also a need to correct this situation through cabinet-level meetings.

Also, until now, we have tried to encourage the development of private consulting firms; yet administrative organizations of the Ministry of Construction, such as the Japan Highway Public Corporation [JHPC], are now trying to engage in overseas consulting. Isn't this contradictory?

MoC international section head: This is because there have been calls to utilize the knowhow of organizations such as the JHPC, and because the government wants to become involved from now on in new fields such as this.

Representative Imai: Whenever something new comes along, every government office wants to get involved. It seems to me that this is a ship with too many captains (though I encourage the Ministry of Construction to continue with its efforts).

Representative Ejima: There is a lot of economic cooperation with the ASEAN nations, but they consider this to be a matter of course. We should give aid to areas which will truly appreciate it, such as Africa. Somewhere, we should decide upon a definite policy, and effectively implement it.

Representative Tanaka: I believe there was a cabinet-level committee on ODA during the Fukuda administration. If such a committee is to be established, on ODA, the Ministry of Finance may give it a hard time by imposing prior restraints on speaking out. We should like the committee without such restraints.

Next, legal structures concerning the advance into overseas construction markets are out of date. We would like the Ministry of Construction to make efforts to rectify this situation.

Third, concerning support of the United Nations University, only Japan has contributed as much as \$100 million--70 percent of the total--while the United States has not contributed anything. I have said this a number of times before, but shouldn't we push the United States, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to contribute? Also, now that Japan has contributed such a large amount, will we have a commensurate amount of control?

MoE Science and International Affairs Bureau Head: Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we have been pressing the United States on this issue all along. We have also placed a representative on the steering committee, are mutually exchanging opinions on projects, and representing Japan's position.

Representative Tanaka: Yet isn't it strange that nothing but symposiums on North Korea are being held? Is it right for Japan to abandon its position of leadership?

Economic Cooperation Bureau Head: Concerning donations by the United States, we are engaging in ongoing negotiations, and the choice of Mr Hester (phonetic) as first president of the university, was also made with U.S. donations in mind. However, there is a mood among the developed nations that the UN University is flawed because it has been co-opted by Japan, or that it is a matter of course that wealthy Japan should see to the needs of the university.

MoFA UN Bureau Policy Section Head: With regard to North Korea: in principle, the choice of symposiums is up to the university, but in the future it may be necessary to provide some sort of guidance on the subject through this office.

1985 General Account Budget Proposal on ODA by Five Ministries and One Agency
Outline of MoFA Estimated Requests for Fiscal 1985 ODA General Account Budget

I. Portion of ODA General Account Budget accounted for by MoFA

	1983			1984			1985		
	金額 (1)	伸率 (2)	構成比 (3)	金額 (1)	伸率 (2)	構成比 (3)	要求額 (4)	伸率 (2)	構成比 (3)
Total ODA General Account Budget	4,813	8.9	100.0	5,281	9.7	100.0	5,883	11.4	100.0
MoFA	2,324	10.8	48.3	2,512	8.1	47.6	2,813	12.0	(47.8)
MoF	2,160	6.8	44.9	2,188	1.3	41.4	—	—	—
Other ministries, Agencies	328	10.3	6.8	581	77.0	11.0	—	—	—

Key:

1. Amount (100 millions of yen)
2. Increase (percent)
3. Percent of total
4. Requested

Note: 985 ODA budget total calculated on the basis of estimated requests (11.4 percent increase).

II. MoFA Estimated Requests for 1985 ODA General Account Budget

	1983	1984			1985		
	予(1)算額	予(1)算額	増(2)減額	伸(3)率	要(4)求額	増(2)減額	伸(3)率
(5)	2,324	2,512	188	8.1	2,813	301	12.0
(6)	990	1,065	75	7.6	1,160	95	8.9
(7)	763	815	52	6.8	908	94	11.5
(8)	(770)	(824)	(54)	(7.0)	(915)	(91)	(11.0)
(9)	529	572	42	8.0	615	43	7.6
(10)	(839)	(850)	(11)	(1.3)	(893)	(43)	(5.1)
(11)	42	60	19	44.6	129	69	114.8

[Key on following page]

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 1. Budget (100 millions of yen) | 7. International cooperation organizations |
| 2. Increase or decrease | 8. (Including non-ODA) |
| 3. Percent change | 9. Donations for international relations, etc. |
| 4. Requested | 10. (Including non-ODA) |
| 5. Total MoFA ODA budget | 11. Other |
| 6. Grants | |

Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding.

III. Important Items

The expansion and strengthening of official development aid (ODA), which actively serves the world community, is an international duty of Japan, a peaceful nation and possessor of the Free World's second greatest economic strength. At the same time, serving the development of the world economy as well as world stability and peace through such aid, contributes to the prosperity of the nation.

From this standpoint, the ODA budget for fiscal 1985 (the last year of the ODA mid-term target) aims for the expansion and strengthening of ODA through the following important items. At the same time, it aims for further expansion and strengthening of the mechanisms for evaluation, and broadened exchanges with developing nations on the subject of aid policy. The budget supports a more effective and efficient carrying out of ODA.

In addition, Japan will continue to serve through its cooperation with international organizations such as the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP), the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA).

Important Areas

i) Expansion of basic subsistence aid: development of agriculture through expansion and strengthening of grants and technical cooperation; further support of aid in fields which directly serve the welfare of the people, in food aid, sanitation and medicine.

ii) Expansion of human development aid for the ASEAN Human Development Project, the Okinawa International Center, ASEAN youth employment, etc.

Important Target Regions

iii) Strengthening of aid to poor nations, particularly least less developed countries (LLDC).

Structure for Implementation

iv) Strengthening of links with the private sector: support of aid activities by NGO, and strengthening of liaison with such organizations. Support of development education (increasing the understanding of the general public with regard to development aid).

v) Strengthening of the structure for implementation of economic cooperation: increase in the number of personnel involved in economic cooperation; enlargement of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (increase in the number of career specialists).

IV. Grants (Aid Expenses for Economic Development, Etc.)

1. Estimated requests for Fiscal 1985 (100 millions of yen)

	<u>1983 Budget</u>	<u>1984 Budget</u>	<u>1985 Request</u>	<u>Increase</u>
I) General Aid	862	939	1,028	89
ii) Fishery Aid	79	83	87	4
iii) Disaster Aid	33	25	25	-
iv) Cultural Aid	<u>16</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	990	1,065	1,160	95

Budget trends (expenses for economic development aid, etc.; figures in () are percent increase from previous year):

1981: 830 (10.7)

1982: 920 (10.8)

1983: 990 (7.6)

1984: 1,065 (7.6)

1985: 1,160 (8.9)

2. Important Items

i) Importance of aid to LLDC: grants to LLDC nations (total: 36 nations) will be actively carried out from now on, based on international recognition of the importance of aid to these economically distressed countries, as well as the necessity for expansion of ODA. Also, a policy of grants to LLDC nations has been proposed by the 1979 [DAC] as well as in international forums such as the 1981 UN Conference on LLDC nations. Japan will follow this policy, further enlarging cooperation on grants (making ODA funding as free as possible) to LLDC nations.

ii) Importance of basic subsistence aid: aid will be increased in accordance with the true needs of the recipient nations in basic areas directly related to the development of the economy and society, and the stability and improvement of public welfare.

iii) Importance of human development aid: Japan will serve in the training of the bearers of economic and social development of recipient countries, and regards as important human development aid which furthers the development of those countries.

V. International Cooperation Organizational Expenses

1. Estimated Requests for Fiscal 1985

<u>1983</u>		<u>1984</u>		<u>1985</u>		
予 算 額 (1)	%	予 算 額 (1)	%	要 求 額 (2)	%	増 (3) 減
(4) 76,993	108.2	82,385	107.0	91,462	111.0	9,077
(5) 71,875	108.8	77,734	108.2	86,678	111.5	8,944
(6) 58,420	110.2	63,419	108.6	71,473	112.7	8,054
(7) 9,692	114.5	10,461	107.9	11,970	114.4	1,509
(8) —	—	1,065	0	1,157	108.6	92
(9) 8,898	111.3	9,253	104.0	10,000	108.1	747
(10) 1,432	106.9	1,481	103.4	1,553	104.9	72
(11) 5,018	108.3	5,446	108.5	6,596	121.1	1,150
(12) 3,769	103.2	3,927	104.2	4,001	101.9	74
(13) 775	117.3	814	105.1	856	105.2	42
(14) 6,734	108.4	7,050	104.7	7,510	106.5	460
(15) 1,424	109.9	1,516	106.4	1,653	109.0	137
(16) 5,433	118.2	6,248	115.0	7,860	125.8	1,612
(17) 376	112.7	416	110.6	479	115.1	63
(18) 780	114.2	840	107.7	1,000	119.0	160
(19) 11,787	107.2	12,464	105.7	13,938	111.8	1,474
(20) 787	105.8	821	104.3	878	106.9	57
(21) 1,516	107.9	1,617	106.7	2,022	125.0	405
(22) 1,991	104.3	2,001	100.4	2,158	107.8	157
(23) 11,462	102.7	12,314	107.4	13,047	106.0	733
(24) 5,118	101.0	4,851	90.9	4,784	102.9	133
(25) 400	200.0	800	200.0	1,000	125.0	200
(26) 1,450	100.0	1,230	84.8	1,270	103.3	40
(27) 3,268	95.6	2,821	80.2	2,514	95.9	- 107

[Key on following page]

Key:

1. Budget (millions of yen)
2. Budget request
3. Increase/decrease
4. Total international cooperation organizational expenses
5. Total grants to international cooperation organizations
6. Total international technical cooperation expenses
7. Trainee acceptance expenses
8. ASEAN youth employment expenses
9. Expenses for dispatching of specialists
10. Expenses for supply of machine parts
11. Technical Cooperation Center expenses
12. Sanitation and medical cooperation expenses
13. Population and family planning cooperation expenses
14. Agricultural and forestry cooperation expenses
15. Industrial development cooperation expenses
16. Expenses for dispatch of overseas cooperation youth groups
17. Welfare expenses for specialists
18. Expenses for maintenance of specialist development
19. Development survey expenses
20. Development cooperation expenses
21. Free funding cooperation expenses
22. Overseas relocation expenses
23. Administrative expenses
24. Total international cooperation organizational capital
25. Investment financing capital for development
26. Investment financing capital for relocation
27. Gain on facilities capital

Note: Figures for free funding cooperation expenses include expenses for special item surveys.

Budget Trends

	<u>1981</u>		<u>1982</u>		<u>1983</u>		<u>1984</u>		<u>1985</u>	
			(1)		(1)		(1)		(1)	
(2)	85,271	71,147	9.0	76,993	8.2	82,385	7.0	91,462	11.0	
(3)	61,011	66,079	8.3	71,875	8.8	77,734	8.2	86,678	11.5	
(4)	4,260	5,068	19.0	5,119	0.1	4,651	△9.1	4,784	2.9	

Key:

1. Increase (percent)
2. Total international cooperation organizational expenses (millions of yen)
3. Grants
4. Capital

2. Important Items

i) Overseas youth cooperation groups: the number of personnel sent abroad will be increased from 650 to 800, achieving the target for the dispatch of such personnel (1982=430).

Reconditioning of the Hiroo Training Center (2nd year): 800 million yen.

ii) Okinawa International Center (scheduled to open April 1985); establishment of a training system which includes computers and audiovisual materials:

1984 budget: 430 million yen

1985 request: 740 million

Increase: 310 million yen

iii) Expansion of Technology Cooperation Center activities: full-scale operation of ASEAN Human Development Center:

1984 budget: 700 million yen

1985 request: 950 million yen

Increase: 250 million yen

Increase in funding for ASEAN scientific and technological cooperation:

1984 budget: 210 million yen

1985 request: 300 million yen

Increase: 90 million yen

iv) Expansion of JICA: expansion of career specialists education from 20 to 30 personnel.

v) Holding of human development symposium proposed by Japan on 13 July at the Japan-ASEAN foreign ministers conference.

vi) Support for Silver Volunteer activities; dispatch of 30 specialists to China:

1985 request (new): 6 million yen

vii) Development studies: increase from 252 to 281 studies: measures to prevent desertification (150 million yen); measures for poor African farming areas (80 million yen).

viii) Cooperation on the development study for the second Panama canal:

1985 request (new): 170 million yen

ix) Grant activities: increase in funding for investigation corresponding to the increase in grant activity:

1984 budget: 1.62 billion yen

1985 request: 2.02 billion yen

Increase: 400 million yen

x) Expansion of ASEAN youth employment activities: increase of personnel from 750 to 800 (50 in Brunei; new request for 1985).

xi) Remodeling of Tokyo International Center (TIC):

1985 request (new): 1.4 billion yen (first year)

VI. Donations to International Organizations

1. 1985 Estimated Requests (100 millions of yen)

	<u>1983</u> <u>Budget</u>	<u>1984</u> <u>Budget</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>1985</u> <u>Increase</u>	<u>%</u>
Donations to International Organizations	839.3	849.9	893.1	43.2	5.1
Accounted for by ODA	(529.5)	(571.9)	(615.1)	(43.2)	(7.6)

2. Important Items

Japan will continue to serve through cooperation with the UNDP, UNHCR, and UNFPA UNFPA. Contributions (ODA portion) are as follows (100 millions of yen):

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>		
	(1) 予算額	(1) 予算額	(2) 要求額	(3) 増額	(4) 伸率
(5)	137.8	144.8	152.5	7.7	5.4
(6)	115.2	113.2	118.8	5.5	4.9
(7)	91.0	95.4	100.5	5.1	5.3
(8)	25.2	29.0	32.7	3.6	12.5
(9)	21.0	25.0	29.4	4.4	17.6
(10)	24.5	26.4	28.5	2.1	7.9
(11)	19.8	20.2	20.7	0.5	2.3
(12)	529.5	571.9	615.1	43.2	7.6

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Budget | 8. UNICEF |
| 2. Requested | 9. World Food Plan |
| 3. Increase | 10. International agriculture re- |
| 4. Percent increase | search conference group |
| 5. UNDP | 11. Middle East refugee relief |
| 6. UNHCR | plan |
| 7. UNFPA | 12. Total (including others) |

VII. Other Items

1. Strengthening of Links to the Private Sector

Along with promotion of effective and efficient economic cooperation in the present period of strained government finances, the MoFA plans the strengthening of a unified structure for carrying out economic cooperation not only on the government level but also on a public level which effectively utilizes the vitality of the private sector. The MoFA also plans to deepen the general public's understanding of economic cooperation, strengthening a broad base for economic cooperation.

Support of NGO Aid Activities and Strengthening of Liaison

The MoFA is aiming for a closer liaison structure between government and all types of NGO, as well as smooth promotion of the "NGO Aid Support Project," the purpose of which is an organic linking of NGO aid and ODA.

Promotion of Development Education

In order to increase the understanding of the general public concerning development education, the MoFA plans to gather opinions concerning the state of Japan's development education from persons employed in all walks of life by launching an "Association for the Consideration of Development Education" (provisional name) for that purpose, as well as to hold lecture meetings in Japan and to produce many types of materials on the subject for the edification of the public.

2. Strengthening the Structure for Carrying Out Economic Cooperation

The MoFA plans to refurbish and strengthen the structures for carrying out economic cooperation in order to smoothly promote ODA activities, achieve a quantitative expansion of ODA, and provide a suitable response to the needs of developing countries, which are increasing in number and complexity. This includes increasing the number of administrators dealing with economic cooperation (four from the MoFA and 13 from outside the ministry, totaling 17), an increase of 14 regular JICA personnel, and expansion of the JICA International Cooperation Research Center's career specialists (from 20 in 1984 to 30 in 1985).

Status and Outlook for the ODA Mid-Term Target

1. Progress Toward Doubling of ODA Expenditures (figures are \$100 millions)

<div> <div>51~55暦年累計 106.8億ドル Total, 1976-80</div> <div> 倍増以上 → </div> <div>56~60暦年累計 Total, 1981-85 213.6億ドル (目標額) (target)</div> </div>							
暦年 Year	55 1980	56 1981	57 1982	58 1983	59 1984	60 1985	
金額 (億ドル) (1)	33.0	31.7	30.2	37.6			
伸率 (%) (2)		(△4.0)	(△4.7)	(24.4)			
実績額 Total= 99.5億ドル					今後の必要額 (3) 114.1億ドル 必要年平均伸率 31.3% (4) (対前年比)		

Key:

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Amount (\$100 millions) | 3. Needed future amount |
| 2. Increase (percent) | 4. Average needed yearly growth |

2. ODA General Account Budget (figures are 100 millions of yen)

51~55年度累計 12,444 億円 Total, 1976-80	倍增以上 —→	56~60年度累計 Total, 1981-85 24,888 億円 (目標額) (target)
--	------------	--

会 計 年 度 Year	5 5 1980	5 6 1981	5 7 1982	5 8 1983	5 9 1984	6 0 1985
金額 (億円) (1)	3,516	3,965	4,417	4,813	5,281	
伸 率 (%) (2)		(12.7)	(11.4)	(8.9)	(9.7)	

(3) 予算額 18,497 億円

倍增の場合 60


(4) 6,391

Key:

1. Amount (100 millions of yen)
2. Increase (percent)
3. Total
4. Needed in 1985 to double budget (an increase of 111 billion yen over 1984, a 21 percent increase)

Note: Budget for 1982 included 2.1 billion yen in other expenditures and was calculated at 443.8 billion yen.

Doubling of the ODA General Account Budget and Current Trends



Key:

- 100 millions of yen
- Base: 1,244.4 billion yen (1976-80 total)
- Target: 2,388.8 billion yen or more
- Total, 1981-85
- Ceiling (percent)
- Year
- Budget (100 millions of yen)
- Increase (percent)
- Special case
- Note: Budget for 1982 included 2.1 billion yen in other expenditures and was calculated at 443.8 billion yen
- Note: Assuming the requested 11.4 percent increase is made
- Note: Assuming the ODA General Account Budget doubles

MoF Materials for the Ad Hoc Committee for Overseas Economic Cooperation

Estimated Requests for Fiscal 1985 Economic Cooperation Budget (figures are millions of yen)

区 分	前年度予算額 (1)	昭和60年度 概算要求額 (2)	増減 (▲) 額 (3)
1. 経 済 協 力 費 (4)	53,726	60,748	7,022
(1) 食糧増産等援助費 (5)	53,012	60,034	7,022
(2) アジア開発銀行技術援助拠出金 (6)	714	714	0
2. アジア開発銀行出資金 (7)	1,772	1,771	▲ 1
3. 国際金融公社出資金 (8)	—	1,452	▲ 1,452
4. 一次産品共通基金出資金 (9)	1,645	1,644	▲ 1
5. 米州投資公社出資金 (10)	—	372	372
6. 国際復興開発銀行出資金 (11)	1,665	—	▲ 1,665
7. 海外経済協力基金出資金 (12)	160,000	170,000	10,000
8. その他 (開発途上国経済調査等経費) (13)	41	72	31
合 計	218,848	236,060	17,212
(伸 び 率、%) (14)			(7.9%)

Key:

1. 1984 budget
2. Requested, 1985
3. Increase (triangle=decrease)
4. Total Economic Cooperation Expenses
5. Aid to increase food production, etc.
6. Technical aid donations to the Asian Development Bank
7. Asian Development Bank Fund

8. International Finance Corporation Fund
9. Primary Project Joint Fund
10. American Investment Corporation Fund
11. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Fund
12. Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
13. Other (expenses for economic studies on developing countries, etc.)
14. Total (percent increase in parentheses)

Note:

1. Figures do not sum due to rounding.
2. In addition, 29.5 billion yen in subsidies were granted to the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. Adding this results in a total of 265.6 billion yen, an 11.4 percent increase from the previous year (based on estimated requests: [218.8 billion yen+MoF's contribution of 19.5 billion yen] X 1.114=265.6 billion yen).

Materials for the Ad Hoc Committee on Overseas Cooperation: Estimated Requests for Fiscal 1985 Economic Cooperation Budget, EPA

The importance of economic cooperation is increasing along with the increase in Japan's international stature. From the standpoint of future economic cooperation, the EPA plans for a solid increase in the scale of foreign economic cooperation funding activities (as shown below) which account for roughly half of ODA. Also, the EPA will promote effective economic cooperation along with an increase in economic cooperation expenses.

1. Solid Increase in the Scale of Overseas Economic Cooperation Funding

An increase is planned for overseas economic funding for fiscal 1985, taking into consideration the ODA mid-term target, the need for development funding on the part of developing nations, etc.

2. Increase in Economic Cooperation Studies

In order to promote effective aid while adhering to the ODA mid-term goal, an increase is planned in expenditures for support of direct loans, surveys concerning economic cooperation and other expenditures relating to economic cooperation. In addition, study of increases in ODA plans will be promoted after the present mid-term target is reached.

EPA Requests for Fiscal 1985 Overseas Economic Cooperation (Proposed)

1. Overseas Economic Cooperation Funding Budget (figures are 100 millions of yen)

		(1) 5 9 年度予算額	(2) 6 0 年度概算要求額	(3) 対前年度増減(△)率
(4)	(事業規模)			
(5)	直接借款	6,130	6,750	10.1
(6)	一般案件	350	450	28.6
(7)	合計	6,480	7,200	11.1
(8)	(原資)			
(9)	出資金	1,600	1,700	6.3
(10)	交付金	209	295	41.1
(11)	(一般会計計)	(1,809)	(1,995)	(10.3)
(12)	借入金	3,538	4,794	35.5
(13)	基金債券	260	260	0.0
(14)	(財政投融资計)	(3,798)	(5,054)	(33.1)
(15)	自己資金等	873	151	△82.7
(16)	合計	6,480	7,200	11.1

Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. 1984 budget | 9. Capital |
| 2. 1985 estimated requests | 10. Grants |
| 3. Percent increase (triangle= decrease) from previous year | 11. (General Account total: 9 and 10) |
| 4. Activities | 12. Loan deposits |
| 5. Direct loans | 13. Endowment bonds |
| 6. General items | 14. (Public financing investment 12 and 13) |
| 7. Total | 15. Private funding, etc. |
| 8. Financial resources | 16. Total |

2. EPA Administrative Expenses Related to Economic Cooperation

Expenses needed for effective implementation of direct loan decisions, needed studies for the promotion of direct loans to developing countries, long-term planning decisions for economic cooperation centering on direct loans, studies relating to economic cooperation such as evaluation of aid effectiveness and for supervision of overseas economic cooperation funding:

1984 budget: 91,862,000 yen

1985 estimated request: 101,654,000 yen

MITI Estimated Requests for the Fiscal 1985 ODA General Account Budget

As achievement of the ODA mid-term target nears, MITI is planning the further development of overseas development studies, cooperation on "human development," research cooperation, unified research on developing countries as well as aid for activities to promote the trade of such countries, and unified economic cooperation combining trade and investment, in order to promote effective economic cooperation which meets the varied needs of the developing countries. For the ODA General Account Budget, MITI is requesting an 11.8 percent increase, from the 1984 total of 15.80 billion yen to a 1985 total of 17.66 billion yen.

1. Promotion of Overseas Development Studies

In the area of government-based cooperation, MITI plans to expand the industrial plant renovation program beyond the presently targeted ASEAN region, and to expand overseas development studies. In addition, basic research activities on the development of natural resources will be increased, such as ocean-floor resource studies using the ship "No 2 Hakuryo Maru."

With regard to private cooperation activities, Japan plans to increase its consulting activities in such areas as determination of unified modernization plans to assist medium and small businesses in developing countries, and economic cooperation on construction of economic self-sufficiency plants, which will improve the industrial structure of developing countries.

Commission fees for overseas development studies by international cooperation organizations: creation of development plans in the area of industrial and energy resources, feasibility studies, implementation of plant renovation cooperation activities, based on government requests.

1984 budget: 4,023 million yen

1985 request: 4,300 million yen

Commission fees for studies on unified development planning by private organizations: determination of industrial technology development plans for ASEAN nations as well as unified modernization planning studies to assist medium and small enterprises.

1984 budget: 61 million yen

1985 request: 122 million yen

Commission fees for basic studies of natural resource development, by international cooperation organizations and metals and mining organizations: natural resource development studies, basic location studies for mineral resources as well as deep ocean-floor resource studies, based on government requests.

1984 budget: 2,393 million yen

1985 request: 2,704 million yen

Subsidies for overseas consulting activities: one-half funding for the Overseas Consulting Enterprise Association.

1984 budget: 169 million yen

1985 request: 168 million yen

Other non-ODA economic cooperation with medium and small enterprises overseas (aid for training development specialists): one-half funding for the International Development Center (non-profit).

1984 budget: 37 million yen

1985 request: 33 million yen

Subsidies for technical cooperation with medium and small enterprises overseas: three-quarter funding for the Japan Plant Association.

1984 budget: 139 million yen

1985 request: 154 million yen

Subsidies for basic studies on overseas mineral resources: fixed quota of one-half and three-quarter funding for metals and mining organizations.

1984 budget: 403 million yen

1985 request: 296 million yen

Subsidies for cooperation on construction of economic self-sufficiency plants: three-quarter funding for the Japan Plant Association.

1985 request (new): 31 million yen

2. Promotion of Trainee Reception and Dispatch of Private Specialists

Concerning private-sector training activities such as reception of overseas technicians, in order to meet the growing calls for reception of Look East trainees from Malaysia, as well as trainees from Korea and Pakistan, MITI plans to increase the number of personnel received, as well as increase overseas technical correspondence education and overseas training, etc. In addition, MITI plans to increase the number of private specialists sent overseas, in response to the strong requests of the developing countries.

Subsidies for training activities such as reception of overseas technicians: three-quarter funding for the overseas technician training associations (non-profit) and exchange associations (nonprofit). Reception of technicians from developing countries, instructor training, on-site training, overseas technical correspondence education as well as orientation activities, based on private sector requests.

1984 budget: 3,466 million yen

1985 request: 3,750 million yen

Subsidies for dispatch of private specialists: one-half and three-quarter funding for the Overseas Trade Development Association (nonprofit). Dispatch of private-sector specialists in the fields of production technology and management, registration of specialists, training prior to dispatch overseas, collection of basic information from specialists sent overseas.

1984 budget: 1,062 million yen

1985 request: 1,165 million yen

Subsidies to overseas activity centers: one-half and three-quarter funding for the Japan-Thailand Economic Cooperation Association.

1984 budget: 58 million yen

1985 request: 62 million yen

Subsidies for Japan-China economic exchange activities: three-quarter funding for the Japan-China Economic Council (nonprofit).

1984 budget: 28 million yen

1985 request: 28 million yen

3. Promotion of Research Cooperation

MITI will carry out basic, applied and practical research cooperation in order to expand joint research activities on the part of Japanese and developing-country technicians, in response to recently increasing requests from the ASEAN nations and others.

International production technology research: promotion of basic research cooperation.

1984 budget: 178 million yen

1985 request: 191 million yen

Commission fees for promotion of research cooperation by private organizations: promotion of cooperation on applied research; pilot plants will be established for carrying out joint operations research in the following three areas: the structure of physiologically active substances (Malaysia), medium-scale solar electric-power generation for villages (Indonesia) and effective utilization of unused or scarce resources (Thailand). New requests include funding for research on fabrication of lightweight building materials from ash (Malaysia)

and funding for research on a multipurpose Sterling engine using wood for fuel (Philippines).

1984 budget: 135 million yen

1985 request: 452 million yen

Grants for research and development cooperation for the Japan Industrial Machinery Industries' Association (three-quarter funding): activities to promote research on a practical level; industrial technology research in the Philippines on multipurpose use of tropical resources.

1984 budget: 94 million yen

1985 request: 99 million yen

4. Promotion of Unified Research on Developing Countries

In order to promote expansion of trade and economic cooperation in developing regions, MITI plans an expansion of unified research undertaken by the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs concerning economic and other conditions in developing regions.

Grants to the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs:

1984 budget: 967 million yen

1985 request: 1,071 million yen

Other non-ODA economic cooperation expenses: to the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs (three-quarter funding).

1984 budget: 1,739 million yen

1985 request: 1,748 million yen

Commission fees for economic development analysis; to the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs:

1984 budget: 144 million yen

1985 request: 175 million yen

6. Support for Donations to International Organizations

MITI will actively donate necessary capital to international organizations, in view of their importance in supporting the economic and social progress of developing countries.

Donations to the ASEAN Trade, Investment and Tourism Center:

1984 budget: 224 million yen

1985 request: 246 million yen

Commission fees for activities to raise the level of productivity in Asia:

1984 budget: 301 million yen

1985 request: 332 million yen

Donations to the UN Industrial Development Organization:

1984 budget: 301 million yen

1985 request: 179 million yen

Special Account Appropriation for Patents: contribution to the International Secretariat for the Protection of Industrial Proprietary Rights.

1984 budget: 11 million yen

1985 request: 10 million yen

6. Support for the Promotion of Trade and Industry in Developing Countries

In order to support the medium- and long-term development of the developing countries, promotion of investment in Japan and promotion of imports from developing countries is indispensable. From this viewpoint, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) and others will expand cooperation to promote trade and industry in developing countries, and promote overseas investment and development imports to be carried out by private organizations in Japan.

Subsidies to JETRO (quota of one-half funding) for promotion of trade in developing countries:

1984 budget: 1,589 million yen

1985 request: 2,073 million yen

Subsidies to the Cultural Exchange Association (quota of funding) for consulting on exports to Japan: consulting activities for the expansion of exports to Japan from Taiwan:

1985 request (new): 4 million yen

Grants to private organizations (three-quarter funding) for promotion of overseas investment and development imports: carrying out of studies on investment in developing countries and on development imports:

1984 budget: 61 million yen

1985 request: 61 million yen

MITI Estimated Budget Requests, Fiscal 1985 (100 millions of yen)

		1984 Budget	1984 Budget	% Rise
				(%)
(1)	1. 海外開発計画調査事業等			
(2)	海外開発計画調査委託費	4,023	4,300	6.9
(3)	総合開発計画調査委託費	61	122	100.0
(4)	資源開発計画基礎調査事業委託費	2,393	2,704	13.0
(5)	海外コンサルティング振興事業費補助金	169	168	Δ 0.7
(6)	[他に非ODA経済協力費]	[37]	[33]	Δ 10.0
(7)	海外中小企業技術協力費補助金	139	154	10.5
(8)	海外鉱物資源基礎調査補助金	403	296	Δ 26.6
(9)	経済自立型プラント建設協力事業費補助金	-	31	-
(10)	2. 研修生受入れ及び民間専門家派遣事業等			
(11)	海外技術者受入等研修事業費補助金	3,466	3,750	8.2
(12)	民間専門家派遣事業費補助金	1,062	1,165	9.8
(13)	海外協力センター事業費補助金	58	62	6.9
(14)	日中経済交流等事業費補助金	28	28	0
(15)	3. 研究協力			
(16)	国際産業技術研究事業	178	191	7.3
(17)	研究協力推進事業委託費	135	452	234.8
(18)	研究開発協力事業費補助金	94	99	4.5
(19)	4. 発展途上国に関する総合的研究			
(20)	アジア経済研究所事業費補助金	967	1,071	10.8
(21)	[他に非ODA経済協力費]	[1,739]	[1,748]	0.5
(22)	経済開発分析事業委託費	144	175	22.2
(23)	5. 国際機関への拠出等			
(24)	ASEAN貿易投資観光促進センター拠出金	228	246	8.0
(25)	アジア生産性向上事業委託費	301	332	10.3
(26)	国連工業開発機関拠出金	286	179	Δ 37.2
(27)	[特別会計計上分] 工業所有権保護国際事務局分担金	[11]	[10]	Δ 8.7
(28)	6. 発展途上国貿易産業振興協力を通ずる協力			
(29)	発展途上国貿易促進協力事業費補助金	1,589	2,073	30.5
(30)	対日輸出コンサルティング費補助金	-	4	-
(31)	海外投資及開発輸入促進費補助金	61	61	Δ 0.5
(32)	合 計 (一般会計分ODA予算)	15,797	17,664	11.8
(33)	(特別会計分ODA予算)	-	10	-
(34)	(非ODA経済協力費)	1,794	1,799	0.3

Key:

1. Overseas development planning activities (total)
2. Overseas development planning commission fees
3. Unified development planning commission fees
4. Basic resource development study commission fees
5. Subsidies for promotion of overseas consulting
6. [Other non-ODA economic cooperation expenses]
7. Subsidies for technical cooperation for small and medium overseas businesses
8. Subsidies for basic overseas mineral resource studies
9. Subsidies for economic self-sufficiency plant cooperation activities
10. Reception of trainees and dispatch of private specialists (total)
11. Subsidies for training activities as a reception of overseas technicians, etc.
12. Subsidies for dispatch of private specialists
13. Subsidies for Overseas Cooperation Center activities
14. Subsidies for Japan-China economic exchange activities
15. Research cooperation (total)
16. International industrial technology research activities
17. Commission fees for promotion of research cooperation
18. Subsidies for research and development cooperation activities
19. Combined research on developing countries (total)
20. Subsidies for the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs
21. [Other non-ODA economic cooperation expenses]
22. Economic development analysis commission fees
23. Donations to international organizations (total)
24. Donations to the ASEAN Trade, Investment and Tourism Center
25. Commission fees for activities to raise productivity in Asia
26. Donation to UN Engineering Development Organization
27. [Special account appropriation] Contribution to the International Secretariat for the Protection of Industrial Proprietary Rights
28. Cooperation on promotion of trade and industry in developing countries
29. Subsidies for trade promotion activities for developing countries
30. Subsidies for consulting on exports to Japan
31. Subsidies for promotion of overseas development investment in developing countries
32. Total (ODA General Account Budget)
33. Total (ODA Special Account)
34. Total (non-ODA economic cooperation expenses)

MoC Estimated Requests for Fiscal 1984 Overseas Economic Cooperation Budget

	(1) 予 算			(5) う ち O D A 額		
	(A) 前年度 (2)	(B) 60 年度 (3)	(B/A)-1 (4)	(P) 前年度 (2)	(Q) 60 年度 (3)	(Q/P)-1 (4)
	千円	千円	%	千円	千円	%
(6)	188,620	216,046	14.5	178,022	205,726	15.6
(7)	1,376	1,298	△ 5.7	592	592	0
(8)	51,240	51,040	△ 0.4	41,426	41,426	0
(9)	9,814	9,614	△ 2.0	—	—	—
(10)	31,115	31,115	0	31,115	31,115	0
(11)	10,311	10,311	0	10,311	10,311	0
(12)	136,004	163,708	20.4	136,004	163,708	20.4
(13)	37,134	37,134	0	37,134	37,134	0
(14)	98,870	126,574	28.0	98,870	126,574	28.0
(15)	78,456	78,456	0	49,385	49,385	0
(16)	15,610	15,610	0	15,610	15,610	0
(17)	282,686	310,112	9.7	243,017	270,721	11.4

Key:

1. Budget
2. 1984
3. 1985
4. Percent increase (triangle=decrease)
5. ODA totals
6. Necessary expenses for international cooperation, etc. (total)
7. General cooperation expenses (promotion of international cooperation, guidance and publication of official reports relating to overseas construction industry activities)
8. Expenses for promotion of international cooperation (total)
9. International exchange expenses (bilateral cooperation with other countries and cooperation with international organizations such as the UN, OECD, etc.)
10. Expenses for overseas construction technology development activity (development of construction technology suited to the environmental, social and economic conditions of developing countries)

11. Expenses for Japan-China construction exchange activities (promotion of exchange of construction technology between Japan and China as well as basic research)
12. Expenses for promotion of overseas construction cooperation activities (total)
13. Expenses for the study of basic economic facilities (development planning for present and future economic bases of developing countries; studies on development priorities)
14. Expenses for promotion of overseas construction project cooperation (administration of collection of information on overseas construction projects, general preliminary studies on promising projects, conferences and advising activities on practical realization of projects of merit, establishment and propagation of human resource development systems, employment of high quality administrative personnel for the provision of social capital, and sponsorship of seminars and studies on charges in construction technology)

(Items 6-14 under the supervision of the MoC International Section)

15. Training expenses for industrial development youth groups, overseas course (dispatch of industrial development youth groups overseas; under the supervision of the MoC Construction Promotion Section)
16. International earthquake engineering research expenses (training expenses for instructor research and teaching materials; under the supervision of the MoC Building Research Institute, International Earthquake Engineering Department)
17. Total

MoE Outline of Estimated Budget Requests for Fiscal 1985 Overseas Economic Co-operation (International Planning Section, Science and International Affairs Bureau, MoE)

(1) 算		増(△)減 率 (4)	(5) O D A 計 上 額			増(△)減 率 (4)
昭和59年度 予 算(2)額	昭和60年度 概算要求額(3)		D A C 区(6)分	昭和59年度 予(2)算 額	昭和60年度 概算要求額(3)	
百万円	百万円	%		百万円	百万円	%
(7) 8,891	10,071	13.3		7,866	9,029	14.8
(8) 7,065	8,119		技(直)	7,056	8,110	
(9) 1,495	1,619		技(補)	810	919	
(10) 331	333					
(11) 1,563	1,624	3.9		1,499	1,561	4.1
(12) 276	278	0.7		271	273	0.7
(13) 86	86		際(処), 技(直)	86	86	
(14) 132	134		" "	132	134	
(15) 17	17		際(処)	12	12	
(16) 37	37		" "	37	37	
(17) 4	4		技(直)	4	4	
(18) 228	237	3.9		211	221	4.7
(19) 18	16		技(補)	2	0	
(20) 210	221		"	209	221	
(21) 1,059	1,109	4.7		1,017	1,067	4.9
(22) 125	125		技(直)	83	83	
(23) 1	1		"	1	1	
(24) 513	549		"	513	549	
(25) 43	42		"	43	42	
(26) 181	186		"	181	186	
(27) 188	188		技(補)	188	188	
(28) 8	18		"	8	18	
(29) 260	342	31.5		—	—	
(30) 10,714	12,037	12.3		9,365	10,590	13.1

Key:

1. Budget (100 millions of yen)
2. 1984 budget
3. 1985 request
4. Increase (percent)
5. ODA appropriations
6. DAC categories
7. Total foreign student expansion

8. Foreign student expenses
9. Reception/assistance groups (Japan International Education Association, etc.)
10. Promotion of international student exchange
11. Promotion of international cooperation, including UNESCO activities (total)
12. Promotion of UNESCO activity plans (total)
13. Educational activities for developing countries
14. Scientific activities for developing countries
15. Joint government studies
16. Dispatch of UNESCO technical aid specialists
17. Japan UNESCO domestic committee fellowships
18. Aid for utilization of UNESCO (total)
19. Grants for the Japan Federation of UNESCO Associations
20. Grants for the UNESCO-Asia Cultural Center
21. Other international activities (total)
22. Promotion of cultural exchange
23. Studies on international cooperation
24. Exchanges with developing countries (promotion of education)
25. Educational training for the Asian region (National Institute for Educational Research)
26. Osaka University International Exchange Center
27. Expenses for commissioning aid activities for Indochinese refugees
28. Overseas sports training activities
29. Cooperation with the UN University
30. Total

12622

CSO: 8129/0613

ECONOMIC

INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT JUMPS 11.2 PERCENT IN 1984

OW290909 Tokyo KYODO in English 0822 GMT 29 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 29 Jan (KYODO)--Spurred by rising exports to the United States, Japan's industrial output jumped 11.2 percent in 1984 over the previous year, marking the largest annual growth in 11 years, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry said in a preliminary report Tuesday.

It was the first double-digit annual rise since an 11.1 percent increase for 1976, MITI officials said. It compared with a record 17.5 percent rise for 1973 and a 3.6 percent advance for 1983, MITI officials said.

The industrial production index for 1984 was given as 116.6, against 100 for 1980.

Export-oriented electric machinery industry output soared 29.4 percent, precision machinery went up 15.9 percent, general machinery up 13.1 percent and both transport machinery and steel up an identical 10.3 percent.

Industrial shipments in 1984 rose 8.7 percent from the previous year, compared with the 3.5 percent rise for 1983. The officials said the 1984 shipment index was 112.4, also against 100 for 1980.

Electric machinery shipments soared 26.2 percent, precision machinery advanced 17.6 percent and general machinery went up 12.1 percent.

Manufacturing inventory last year rose 2.9 percent over the previous year and the inventory to sales ratio declined 4.1 percent on rising shipments, the officials said.

Japan's industrial output in last year's fourth quarter rose 2.9 percent over the preceding quarter, compared with the 1.5 percent quarterly rise for the third quarter, the 2.8 percent advance for the second and the 3.2 percent rise for the first quarter, the officials said.

The country's industrial production last December, however, declined 0.4 percent from the previous month after seasonal adjustments, the preliminary report said.

The December output rose 9.2 percent over a year ago before seasonal adjustment, failing to score a double-digit rise for the first time in three months. The production index for the month was 120.5, also against 100 for 1980.

However, the officials said industrial sectors have optimistic views about the future outlook. The manufacturing industry output forecast index will show a 0.6 percent gain over December in January and a 1.1 percent rise in February after seasonal adjustment, they said.

After seasonal adjustment, December industrial shipments declined 1.3 percent from November while inventory in the month edged up 1.1 percent over November, the report said.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC:

JAPAN, U.S. AIRCRAFT MAKERS TO COOPERATE

OW251109 Tokyo KYODO in English 0805 GMT 25 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 25 Jan (KYODO)--Three Japanese aircraft builders are showing a positive response to a call from British Aerospace [BAE] for production collaboration, industry sources said Friday.

A formal agreement is expected to be reached in March at the earliest on the first full-fledged production tie-up between the Japanese and British industries. The Japanese companies are Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Fuji Heavy Industries.

Negotiations are now well under way on prices and other details of the accord, the sources said.

The British company made the call last fall, sounding out the Japanese on their intention of taking part in the BAE 146 series 300 development program.

The Japanese see merit in the offer which they hope will keep their order books from depleting.

If the deal goes through, the Japanese expect to undertake the manufacture of wing flaps and other movable parts amounting to 1 to 2 percent of the aircraft.

The value of the work could amount to somewhere between 50 million yen (197,000 dollars) and 100 million yen (394,000 dollars) per plane, the sources estimated.

BAE apparently expects the Japanese participation in the program would be helpful in seeking buyers of the plane in Japan.

Because the four-turboprop transport aircraft makes its maintenance and control relatively costlier than twin-turboprop jets, its popularity among the world's airline companies remains low, the sources said.

The BAE 146-300, with lengthened fuselage and equipped with a digital automatic flight control and guidance system, is designed to have a standard seating capacity of 122, considerably larger than the series 100 and 200 models. Its first flight is scheduled for 1987 and first delivery for the following year.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

JAPAN SEEKS END TO AUTO EXPORT RESTRAINT

OW300211 Tokyo KYODO in English 0033 GMT 30 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 30 Jan (KYODO)--Japan's intention to discontinue its voluntary curb on auto exports to the United States is expected to come up for discussion at a meeting of the Japanese and U.S. trade ministers in Kyoto next month.

International Trade and Industry Minister Keijiro Murata intends to seek Washington's understanding of the Japanese position when he meets with U.S. Trade Representative William Brock, officials said.

They are to hold talks separately from a meeting of officials from Japan, the U.S., Canada and the European community scheduled for 9-11 February.

Under the present bilateral agreement, the restraint, now in its fourth year, will expire at the end of next March.

Against a backdrop of record earnings posted by U.S. automakers last year and a sharp drop in unemployment in the U.S. industry, a continuation of the curb into a fifth year has fallen into disfavor with both U.S. and Japanese policymakers, the officials said.

General Motors Corp, Ford Motor Co and Chrysler Corp are believed to have netted more than 10 billion dollars jointly, the highest on record.

The figure surpasses the previous high of 6.3 billion dollars in 1983.

The huge earnings, a strong pickup in U.S. auto production and the improved unemployment picture do not warrant continuation of the Japanese restraint, they said.

The time has come for Japan to drop the restraint, they said.

Yet, officials of the Trade Ministry consider it necessary to institute some new form of restrictions to prevent a sudden rise in exports.

As an example, they pointed to an administrative guidance on Japanese automakers. In case of sharp increase in shipments becomes inevitable, the restraint could be revived, they said.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

IMPORTED CAR SALES SHOW INCREASE IN 1984

OW261059 Tokyo KYODO in English 0803 GMT 26 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 26 Jan (KYODO)--Imported car dealers are stepping up sales campaigns, cheered by a sizable increase in sales last year.

Sales totaled 41,982 vehicles in 1984, up 19.7 percent over the previous year, the first gain in five years.

Many dealers expect the uptrend to continue this year, with annual sales topping 50,000 units, the second highest on record next only to an all-time high of 60,161 in 1979.

Japanese customers are reaffirming their love for imports as increased prices for domestic cars have narrowed price gaps between them, industry sources said.

As other major factors, they cited simplified import procedures and the increased variety of styling choices offered by imports.

Sales of American cars remained depressed, however, with their gas-guzzling image making them look unattractive to Japanese customers, they said.

Sales of American imports totaled 2,382 units, claiming only 5.67 percent of the imported car market.

The figure is one-seventh the peak 1979 level of 16,739 units.

West German cars obtained a lion's share of 77.8 percent.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

JAPAN REMAINS TOP MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCER

OW251111 Tokyo KYODO in English 0827 GMT 25 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 25 Jan (KYODO)--Japan produced a record number of motor vehicles in 1984 thanks to brisk exports mainly of trucks, remaining the world's largest auto producer for the fifth straight year, it was announced Friday.

The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) said output of passenger cars, trucks and buses totaled 11,464,920 units last year, up 3.2 percent from 1983.

Car output dipped 1.1 percent to 7,073,173 units, well below America's output of 7.77 million units. The United States replaced Japan as the world's No 1 car manufacturer for the first time in five years. Japanese car output fell due to sluggish domestic sales and restraint on exports to the United States.

Truck production increased 10.6 percent to a record 4,319,538 units, reflecting strong domestic demand and rising exports.

But output also increased 29.1 percent to 72,209 units.

Domestic sales of cars, trucks and buses came to a record 5,436,757 units, up 1 percent.

By contrast, exports increased 7.8 percent to an estimated 6.11 million units, a record peak exceeding the previous high of 6,048,447 units in 1981.

The output of motorcycles and other motorized two-wheelers decreased 16.2 percent to 4,026,307 units for the third straight yearly fall.

Domestic sales fell 15.6 percent to 2,042,189 units, and exports dropped 19 percent on an estimated 2.12 million units, reflecting a worldwide motorcycle slump.

Industry officials said, however, that the motorcycle business recession is apparently over. Mirroring appreciable progress in inventory adjustment, production has been in excess of year-before levels since last September, the officials said.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

SUHARTO, KEIDANREN GROUP DISCUSS TRADE ISSUES

OW261055 Tokyo KYODO in English 1032 GMT 26 Jan 85

[Text] Jakarta, 26 Jan (KYODO)--President Suharto expressed dissatisfaction Saturday with the different duties imposed by Japan on American and Indonesian plywood.

Suharto's displeasure with the Japanese Government's imposition of duties on Indonesia plywood came during an hour-long meeting he had with a delegation of the Federation of Economic Organization (Keidanren), an influential club made up of top Japanese business leaders.

The delegation, led by Keidanren President Yoshihiro Inayama, is in Jakarta in the course of its current tour of member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Suharto reportedly questioned the Japanese Government's policy of imposing higher duties on Indonesian plywood than America's needle-leaf tree plywood.

Inayama was quoted as telling the president that he would consult with quarters concerned after his return to Japan.

The Jakarta Government has decided to stop exporting logs beginning this year in a step to help the plywood industry.

Suharto reportedly said the plywood issue was not a matter which a man in his position should have to raise, but stressed that the Indonesian constitution stipulated the need to give all Indonesians equal job opportunities.

He further went on to say that 1.8 million Indonesians must be given jobs every year, adding that the plywood issue is important for his country from the employment standpoint.

The president also warned that there have been voices in Indonesia calling for higher duties to be imposed on imported Japanese goods.

In a market-opening measure, the Japanese Government last year lowered duties on Indonesian broadleaf tree plywood from 19.3 percent to 17 percent, but this is still higher than the 15 percent tariffs imposed on American needle-leaf tree plywood.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

1984 CONSUMER INFLATION 2D LOWEST IN 25 YEARS

OW281206 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 26 Jan 85 p 5

[Text] Japan's consumer price inflation rate in 1984 was the second lowest in 25 years, the government reported Friday.

The Management and Coordination Agency said the average consumer price index for 1984 stood at 112.1 against 100 for 1980, up 2.2 percent from the previous year for the second lowest gain in 25 years following a 1.9 percent rise in 1983. The index showed a 1.0 percent increase in 1959.

The agency traced the low inflation rate to sluggish utilities rates against the backdrop of reduced crude oil prices as well as to favorable weather for food crops.

Education fees and transportation costs, however, showed rather noticeable gains, up 4.3 percent and 5.9 percent respectively over a year earlier.

The agency said the nationwide price index in December stood at 113.2, also against 100 for 1980, up 2.6 percent from a year earlier and up 0.2 percent from November.

While fruit prices rose from the preceding month, prices of clothing and utilities dropped.

The agency also said consumer prices in the Tokyo area showed a rather steep gain in January this year over a year earlier due partly to high vegetable and fruit prices.

The prices rose an estimated 3.1 percent in the month over a year before for the first year-to-year gain over 3 percent since a 3.1 percent increase in April last year.

The agency said Tokyo's January consumer price index stood at 115.5 compared with the 1980 standard of 100, up 1.0 percent over December 1984.

Food prices rose 2.9 percent from the preceding month.

In comparison with the same month of 1984, fruit prices jumped 40.6 percent, accounting for nearly one-fifth of the 3.3 percent gain.

Rather steady rises in transportation fees, together with less inclination to a price drop for winter clothes, were also accountable for the price gain, the officials said.

Both the agency and the Economy Planning Agency, however, are rather optimistic about the future price trend, saying vegetable prices are coming down and consumer prices will be stable in February and March barring some drastic weather change.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

CREDIT BANKS TO CUT LONG-TERM PRIME RATE

OW260411 Tokyo KYODO in English 0353 GMT 26 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 26 Jan (KYODO)--Japan's long-term prime lending rate for most-credit worthy customers will be lowered to 7.4 percent per annum by 0.2 percentage points from Monday, long-term credit banks, trust banks and life insurance companies jointly announced Saturday.

The rate cut, following the one last October, is in line with a growing fall in the annual yield of national bonds since late last year.

As a result, five-year financial bonds issued by long-term credit banks and government-financed banks will carry an annual coupon rate of 6.5 percent, off 0.2 percent from now.

"Wide," financial bonds with interest paid at a lump sum at maturity will carry an annual yield of 7.538 percent, off 0.268 percent, and "big," loan funds with revenue receivable at maturity, 7.56 percent, off 0.27 percent.

Housing loan rates offered by commercial banks also will be cut to 7.62 percent from the present 7.72 percent while the reduction may become effective about a month later.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

REVENUE ESTIMATES MAY TRIGGER MAJOR TAX DEBATE

OW260939 Tokyo KYODO in English 0758 GMT 26 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 26 Jan (KYODO)--National tax revenue estimates sent to the Diet this week may touch off a major debate on how long Japan can avoid introducing a large-scale indirect tax patterned on the European value-added tax.

The estimates worked out by the Ministry of Finance show that direct taxes such as income tax and business taxes will account for as much as 73.4 percent of the projected total revenue for the new fiscal year beginning in April.

This is 2.5 points higher than the corresponding fiscal 1984 ratio of 70.9 percent and is next only to the record 73.9 percent registered in fiscal 1974.

The high direct tax ratio has resulted from the tax reforms for the coming fiscal year, in which the government hiked business taxes but gave up an income tax reduction.

In his policy speech to the Diet Friday, Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita said he expected a thorough review of the present tax system.

He was referring to a report of the Governmental Tax System Research Council, which favored the introduction of a general excise tax equivalent to the value-added tax adopted in some European countries.

Upholding its declared policy of seeking reconstruction of the deficit-ridden state finance without resorting to tax hikes, the government has drafted an austere fiscal 1985 budget which has drastically axed social security and education expenses.

But most Ministry of Finance officials, including Takeshita himself, have openly conceded that there is a limit to cutting expenses.

The ratio of direct and indirect taxes in Japan's annual revenue has been kept balanced until 1955. Hikes in income and corporate taxes in successive years boosted the ratio of direct taxes, pushing it up to 70 percent in the late 1970's. This ratio is much higher compared with many European countries which highly rely on indirect taxes.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

JAPAN CRUDE OIL IMPORTS INCREASE IN 1984

OW251107 Tokyo KYODO in English 0726 GMT 25 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 25 Jan (KYODO)--Japan's crude oil imports in 1984 rose 3.2 percent over the previous year to 214.49 million kiloliters, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry said Friday.

Crude imports from Middle East countries increased 2.7 percent to 150.54 million kls, accounting for 70.2 percent of Japan's total crude imports.

Those from Saudi Arabia and Iran declined 0.3 percent and 34.6 percent, respectively, but imports from Qatar and Oman advanced 62.2 percent and 31.2 percent.

Crude imports from Malaysia soared 73.2 percent, those from China went up 18.3 percent and from Mexico up 14.9 percent.

Production of fuel oil in 1984 came to 179.85 million kls, up 3.1 percent from the preceding year.

Japan's fuel oil imports rose 4 percent to 21.2 million kls for the first rise in five years, the officials said.

Fuel oil imports through spot transactions last year accounted for 22.2 percent of the total, compared with 17.9 percent in 1983.

Domestic sales of gasoline edged up 1.4 percent to a record 36.24 million kls for the 10th straight yearly advance to record highs.

Crude oil imports in December dropped 19.2 percent from a year ago to 18.1 million kls mainly due to rising stocks on slumping demand and expectations for a future price reduction by oil-producing nations, the officials said.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

STEEL WORKERS PROTEST TAIWAN, ROK IMPORTS

OW280649 Tokyo KYODO in English 0330 GMT 28 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 28 Jan (KYODO)---A Japanese steel workers' leader Monday called for countermeasures against unfair steel exports to Japan from newly industrializing countries (NIC's).

Takuhiko Nakamura, president of the Japanese Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Unions (Tekko Roren), made the request when he called on Keiji Murata, minister of international trade and industry.

To check a flood of foreign steel products in the Japanese market, Nakamura asked Murata to implement measures against unfair exports from countries like South Korea and Taiwan.

The measures should be flexibly applied, Nakamura said, but include a dumping complaint to the general agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT) and a review of the application of preferential duties to NIC imports.

Nakamura also asked for investment tax credits, a shorter period of depreciation for equipment and structural reform for smaller steelmakers.

Murata said he would try to draw reasonable conclusions from Japan-U.S. talks on Japan's voluntary restraints on steel shipments to the U.S., to assure a stable supply by the Japanese steel industry.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

TOBACCO MONOPOLY CHIEF TO VISIT

OW280647 Tokyo KYODO in English 0611 GMT 28 Jan 85

[Text] Tokyo, 28 Jan (KYODO)--The head of Japan's tobacco monopoly hopes a visit to Beijing planned for mid-February will promote technical cooperation in tobacco production.

Minoru Nagaoka, president of Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation, is scheduled to fly to the Chinese capital 12 February to open representative office there.

Nagaoka said he plans to talk with Chinese officials on technical exchanges between the two countries.

He declined to elaborate, however. He is to return home 15 February.

With denationalization only two months off, the corporation is pressing forward with expansion and modernization programs.

As the Japanese tobacco and cigarette market is to be fully opened to foreign competition 1 April, Nagaoka conceded that it is urgent to strengthen the competitive position of his company, to be known as Japan Tobacco Inc.

The corporation plans to start commercial production of cardiac agents and other biotechnology products shortly.

The corporation claims to have developed technology to mass produce unguinolone 10, a chemical compound based on tobacco cells.

More than 30 Japanese companies have developed technology to produce the compound through synthesization and fermentation processes.

CSO: 4100/180

ECONOMIC

BRIEFS

TV PLANTS FOR PRC--Tokyo, 28 Jan (KYODO)--China has offered two color television set assembling plants from Toshiba Corp, bringing to seven the number of such plants the communist country has bought from the company. Toshiba officials said Monday one of the new plants, worth about 2.5 billion yen (9.8 million dollars), will be built in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, and the other, valued at some 1.5 billion yen (5.9 million dollars), in Guiyang, Guizhou Province. The Hangzhou plant will turn out more than 200,000 14- and 18-inch sets a year, while the Guiyang plant will assembly 150,000 to 200,000 sets annually, the officials said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0806 GMT 28 Jan 85 OW]

ISUZU TRUCKS TO PRC--Tokyo, 28 Jan (KYODO)--Isuzu Motors Ltd announced a 75 billion yen (295 million dollar) truck and truck technology transfer deal with the China Automotive Industry Corporation Monday. The contract calls for the export of 40,000 trucks, each with a loading capacity of 2 to 9 tons, over a two-year period starting in 1985. This is the largest single truck export contract between China and a Japanese manufacturer. It also provides for the transfer to China of technology on the manufacture of trucks of 1.5 to 3.5 tons and on the manufacture of main components--engines, transmissions, axles and carburetors. [Excerpt] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0830 GMT 28 Jan 85 OW]

ECU-QUOTED BONDS--Tokyo, 26 Jan (KYODO)--Seiyu Ltd, a major chain store group, will become the first Japanese private firm to issue European currency unit (ECU)-denomination bonds, a company spokesman said Saturday. According to the spokesman, Seiyu is planning to float bonds worth 30 million ECU (about 5.3 billion yen or 20 million dollars) next month, having obtained clear indications of Finance Ministry approval. The five-year bonds will be lead-managed by Banque Paribas of France, with Nomura Securities Co as co-lead manager. While the interest rate has not been set, the spokesman said he thought it would be around 9 percent per annum. Seiyu has decided to issue ECU-quoted bonds because they offer a smaller exchange risk than those based on a single currency. Interest rates are decided by the weighted average of the currency values of 10 European Community member countries. So far, ECU-quoted bond issues in Japan have been limited to banks. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0755 GMT 26 Jan 85 OW]

AUSTRALIAN TITANIUM CONTRACT--Tokyo, 25 Jan (KYODO)--Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd, a top Japanese titanium oxide maker, will join in the production of titanium materials in Australia to secure cheaper materials over the long run, a company spokesman said Friday. The Osaka-based maker has recently purchased a 15 percent equity stake in Westralian Sands Ltd of Australia which mines ilmenite, a titanium material, thus making Ishihara the second largest stockholder in the company following Tioxide Australia Proprietary Ltd which holds a 36 percent portion. In cooperation with Westralian, the Japanese firm and Tioxide Australia will build a plant there to refine ilmenite to synthetic rutile at a cost of 65 million Australian dollars (53 million U.S. dollars). Ishihara will take 40,000 tons and ship them to Japan to produce titanium oxide, the spokesman said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0357 GMT 25 Jan 85 OW]

GRANTS TO MONGOLIA--Tokyo, 25 Jan (KYODO)--Japan will extend grants totaling 16 million yen (63,000 dollars) to Mongolia for the purchase of foreign language laboratory equipment, the Foreign Ministry said Friday. Officials said the funds will be provided to the Mongolian State University established in 1975 where Japanese language is taught by instructors from the Governmental Japan Foundation. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0358 GMT 25 Jan 85 OW]

LIGHT-CONTROLLING GLASS--Tokyo, 24 Jan (KYODO)--Asahi Glass Co has developed a light permeability-controlling glass which can change its brightness by an electric switch, a company spokesman said Thursday. According to the spokesman, Asahi Glass has established technology for electrochromic glass, which is made up of two sheets of electrically conductive transparent glass. Sandwiched between them are tungsten oxide film and company-developed film-state electrolyte. Tungsten's trait to turn the color of its crystal structure to blue by dint of the work of ions in the electrolyte when electric current is applied enables the glass to control the light passing through. Having the light permeable range of 10-85 percent (about 90 percent for ordinary glass), the glass will make curtains or blinds unnecessary, the spokesman said. While the only catch is its high price, about twice the price of prevailing high-quality glass, the company is planning to commercialize the glass in about 2 years for such uses as train and building window panes and display screens for electronics equipment. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0420 GMT 24 Jan 85 OW]

HOST COMPUTER MODELS--Tokyo, 23 Jan (KYODO)--Mitsubishi Electric Corp Wednesday unveiled three new mainframe computer models--Melcom Ex 830, Ex 840 and Ex 850. A Mitsubishi spokesman said shipments of the new computers will begin at the end of June with an annual sales target of 200 units in the initial year and a total of 1,000 units for the next 3 years. The 3 computer models, each with 256 kilo-bit dynamic Random Access Memory (RAM), are to carry price tags of 2.6 million yen (10,000 dollars) for Ex 830, 4.1 million yen (16,200 dollars) for Ex 840 and 7.9 million yen (31,000 dollars) for Ex 850, the spokesman said. The "Melcom Ex" series are not compatible with International Business Machine (IBM) computers, the spokesman said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1215 GMT 23 Jan 85 OW]

NEW CANCER-HEATING DEVICE--Tokyo, 23 Jan (KYODO)--The Research Development Corporation of Japan announced Wednesday that a new, improved cancer-killing

device based on heat therapy would be put on the market toward the end of next month. The semigovernmental organization said the device, employing high-frequency electricity capable of infiltrating the whole body, removed over half of 63 tumors and shrank over 80 percent in 12 other cases of clinical tests. Yamamoto Vinyter Co in Osaka devised the apparatus for the public corporation and the clinical tests were undertaken at seven medical facilities, including those of Kyoto University and the National Cancer Center in Tokyo, the corporation said. Studies so far conducted show that cancer cells are generally susceptible to heat and that heated cells absorb more radioactivity and cancer-killing agents than otherwise. The newly-developed apparatus raises the temperatures of the cancer-affected parts to 42 to 43 degrees C. with 8 megahertz of frequency, the corporation said. It specifies the proper sizes of electrodes through data on the natures, locations and sizes of the cancerous cells, it said. The device sells for 88 million yen (346,400 dollars), it said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1139 GMT 23 Jan 85 OW]

CSO: 4100/180

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